NBA Expansion and Relocation: A Viability Study of Various Cities by Rascher, Daniel A. & Rascher, Heather
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Kinesiology (Formerly Exercise and Sport Science) College of Arts and Sciences
2004
NBA Expansion and Relocation: A Viability Study
of Various Cities
Daniel A. Rascher
University of San Francisco, RASCHER@USFCA.EDU
Heather Rascher
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/ess
Part of the Sports Management Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kinesiology (Formerly Exercise and Sport Science) by an authorized administrator of USF
Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rascher, Daniel A. and Rascher, Heather, "NBA Expansion and Relocation: A Viability Study of Various Cities" (2004). Kinesiology
(Formerly Exercise and Sport Science). Paper 2.
http://repository.usfca.edu/ess/2
274 Rascher and Rascher
274
Journal of Sport Management, 2004, 18, 274-295
© 2004 Human Kinetics Publishers, Inc.
NBA Expansion and Relocation:
A Viability Study of Various Cities
Daniel Rascher
University of San Francisco
Heather Rascher
SportsEconomics
An examination of possible expansion or relocation sites for the NBA is un-
dertaken using a two-equation system requiring two-stage probit least squares
to estimate. The location model forecasts the best cities for an NBA team
based on the underlying characteristics of current NBA teams. The results
suggest that Louisville, San Diego, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Norfolk appear
to be the most promising candidates for relocation or expansion.
Regardless of the state of the economy, many cities continue to pursue big-
league sports franchises so they will locate in their metropolitan area. For instance,
Louisville has been trying to lure a National Basketball Association (NBA) fran-
chise for more than 7 years. More recently, New Orleans was successful in attract-
ing the former Charlotte Hornets to move into a new arena in the city.1 Both North-
ern Virginia and Washington, DC, are currently looking to house a Major-League
Baseball (MLB) team. Moreover, Paul Allen was interested in bringing a National
Hockey League (NHL) or MLB team to the city of Portland, WA, in an effort to
provide content for his regional sports network.
Professional basketball began in the United States in 1946 with eleven teams,
three of which are still in existence. Some teams have gone out of business whereas
others have moved to different cities and have changed names.2 Instances of relo-
cation, however, are infrequent. Some of the recent team relocations include the
Golden State Warriors’ move from San Francisco to Oakland (1971); the Rockets’
move from San Diego to Houston (1971); the Wizards’ move to Washington in
1974 (renamed the Wizards in 1997 from the Washington Bullets); the Nets’ move
to New Jersey (East Rutherford) from New York (1977); the Jazz’s move from
New Orleans to Salt Lake City (1979); the Clippers’ move to Los Angeles from
San Diego (1984); and the Kings’ move to Sacramento from Kansas City (1985).3
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The Vancouver Grizzlies’ move in 2001 to Memphis (over cities such as Louis-
ville, St. Louis, and New Orleans) and the aforementioned Hornets’ move to New
Orleans are the most recent relocations.
One key impetus for relocation is to increase arena-related team revenues.
Some owners argue that the increased revenues from a new arena will put a fran-
chise in a better position to bid for quality players, resulting in a better team, which,
in turn, draws more fans, resulting in more revenues, and so on. The type of sports
facility and lease arrangements are as important as the quality of the market in an
owner’s location decision.
For instance, in the NFL a few teams have recently relocated to smaller
markets in order to play in a new stadium with a “sweetheart” lease agreement, in
which the teams are offered more favorable stadium deals in order to entice them
to relocate. In 1995, the Raiders moved from Los Angeles (the second largest
market in the U.S.) back to Oakland, and the Rams moved from Los Angeles to St.
Louis. In 1996, the Browns moved to Baltimore to become the Ravens, and the
Oilers moved to Tennessee from Houston (becoming the Titans) the following
year.4 In each of these cases, the new market was smaller (in terms of population)
than the previous market. Moreover, the Hornets move from Charlotte to New
Orleans was primarily because of a more appealing facility agreement with New
Orleans for a state-of-the-art facility; the relocation, however, placed the team in a
smaller media market and a less affluent city.5
Team relocations, and the threat thereof, have commensurately increased
the value of major league clubs. The Oakland A’s and Montreal Expos (MLB), the
Minnesota Vikings (NFL), and numerous NHL franchises are also considering
new locations. This is primarily because of the fact that the four major sports leagues
control the supply of teams, the placement of franchises, and the number of teams
that are permitted to locate in any market. In spite of demand, the leagues are
reluctant to increase the rate of expansion-team creation. In fact, since the NFL
and AFL merged in 1966, the NFL has added only seven additional teams, even
though several markets desire franchises.6
Which cities should teams choose when considering their ideal locale? The
choice of a city depends on at least three major factors: the owner’s personal pref-
erence, the political climate, and the economics of the location. Whereas many
team owners are profit maximizers and make decisions accordingly, some owners
might be more personally motivated, perhaps choosing to move a team to a city
because it is where they live. For instance, Georgia Frontiere, owner of the St.
Louis Rams, moved the team from Los Angeles to her hometown of St. Louis,
MO. Similarly, the Minnesota Vikings are considering a move to San Antonio,
TX, because owner Billy Joe “Red” McCombs is from San Antonio.7 Personal
preference, as in these cases, is idiosyncratic and will therefore not be investigated
in this analysis.
Political support for a major league team in a city is very important because
arenas and stadiums are often financed in part or in full by local governments.8 The
locational decision is usually the result of a bidding competition among the gov-
ernments of various cities, each offering a variety amenities to the teams in order
276 Rascher and Rascher
to attract the team to their locale. In fact, the moves by the Oilers, Rams, and
Raiders were all to smaller markets, but the stadium leases were more favorable in
these markets, despite the reduced population of their new locations.
Finally, the economics of the market matters. Regions with larger, richer
populations and those that contain large businesses or numerous corporate head-
quarters are assumed to more readily support a team than a smaller city that lacks
these desirable demographic features. The three overarching decision criteria, how-
ever, can be interrelated. For instance, the degree of public funding is likely to
correspond to the size and economic demographics of the market. In fact, there is
a correlation of .33 (significant at the 1% level) between the percentage of public
funding and the population for six cities with NBA teams that are in relatively
smaller population centers. In addition, an owner’s preferences are likely to be in
favor of locating in a large metropolitan area because of the potential favorable
economics.
This article analyzes the economics of each potential market to determine
which cities are likely to be the best prospects for expansion or relocation of NBA
teams. A hierarchical two-equation system is employed. In the first equation of the
location model, the 25 current U.S. markets that have NBA franchises are exam-
ined to determine the relationship among the underlying factors.9 It is then used to
forecast the relative likelihood of other cities being similar enough to NBA cities
to be able to support a team (again based on economic factors, not personal prefer-
ence or political factors). This model is similar to the analysis for baseball teams
by Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999), except that the NBA model has additional
variables, two stages, and uses a substantially different econometric approach.
The second equation is a revenue equation. The revenue forecasts generated
are used as inputs into the first equation. The logic is that the potential revenues
that each location could generate are certainly important factors in an owner’s
location decision.
One objective of the overall analysis is to be able to aid in the financial
decision regarding league expansion or team relocation. The current methodology
used in the field involves separate comparisons of cities by population and a few
other measures, as opposed to an integrated approach that captures the relation-
ships between the factors and relative importance of each. A set of models such as
described in this article can be used to rank cities for further, more in-depth analy-
sis, across many sports and in many countries.
The next section examines the basic theory underlying the analysis. The
data, data sources, and limitations are described in the third section. The analysis
and results for the two-equation system is presented in the fourth section, and the
final section provides a summary and a discussion of the results.
Theoretical Model
The location model is a franchise model based on the work, most recently, of
Benjamin Klein (1995). Owners of franchises in the same company have the in-
centive and desire to locate at least some minimum geographic distance away from
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each other, but want to maintain similarity in terms of quality and products offered
in order to reduce uncertainty for customers. For instance, Domino’s Pizza fran-
chises are not allowed to locate near each other unless they are owned by the same
franchisee.
Sports teams (or franchises) operate in a similar manner, and each of the
leagues has developed rules regarding franchise movement and location. In the
NBA, an area with a radius of 75 miles surrounds each NBA team and no other
NBA team is permitted to locate within that radius without permission of the in-
cumbent team. To understand the rationale as to why NBA teams chose their cur-
rent locations, the location model takes into consideration the information avail-
able from current teams and uses that data to determine the common underlying
economic factors of existing NBA locations. The cities currently without NBA
teams are then evaluated based on those factors. In order to discern between suc-
cessful locations of current NBA teams and less successful ones, the revenue equa-
tion in the location model accounts for the relative success of each location.
The general model is Location = f (market characteristics, revenue poten-
tial, political support, owner preferences) and Revenue Potential = g (market char-
acteristics, team characteristics). Market characteristics contain variables such as
population, income, competition from other sports teams, basketball fanaticism,
and corporate depth. Team characteristics contain variables such as prices, win-
ning percentage, and arena quality. The relationship that results from revenue po-
tential is an input into the location relationship. This creates a hierarchical, two-
equation system. Owner preferences are excluded from the models because they
are based on where an owner would like to locate a team and determining this is
above and beyond the scope of economic and political factors. In addition, fran-
chises that are owned by a group or a corporation would have divergent owner
preferences.
Similarly, there are difficulties in trying to model political support. For one
thing, the political support for constructing an NBA arena in a city without an
NBA team might not be revealed in any data available if the issue has not previ-
ously arisen. Information on political support for other major professional sports
teams might be a useful, comparable variable, but many of these cities do not have
any other major professional sports teams. In addition, if a city has already spent a
large sum of public money to build a baseball stadium, it is often unclear whether
it would be more or less likely to finance an NBA arena with public funds.
Another avenue in modeling potential political support is to note whether
political leaders account for the public’s preferences when spending public money,
or if the public votes directly on the issue. If the public votes on the issue, then a
measure of the public’s preferences towards basketball might be informative. An
explanatory variable of the location model, basketball fanaticism, might capture
the public’s likely support for publicly financing an arena. In fact, there is a corre-
lation of –.23 between the existing degree of public support for the current arena
(in those cities with an NBA team) and the basketball fanaticism ranking (which is
defined as higher means = less fanatical, and it is significant at the 5% level).10
Further, cities with higher populations (another of the explanatory variables in the
278 Rascher and Rascher
model) are more likely to publicly fund an arena.11 Therefore, basketball fanati-
cism and population partially capture the degree of political support that an owner
might expect to receive in each potential location.
In summary, the theoretical model is a two-equation system measuring
whether a city is a good or poor candidate for an NBA team. A testable assumption
is that NBA cities that maintain a team over a long period of time have factors in
common. For example, the empirical analysis will determine the importance of
population as a common factor that successful NBA teams share.
The two-equation system representing the model is as follows:
Y
1
 = αY
2
 + β
1
X
1
 + µ
1
Y
2
 = β
2
X
2
 + µ
2
where Y1 is a binary variable, X1and X2 are vectors of independent variables, µ1 and
µ2 are error terms, α and βi (i = 1, 2) are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and
Y2 is a continuous variable. Equation 2 is a revenue equation, is based on the trian-
gular hierarchical structure, and feeds into Equation 1, the location equation. Y1
takes a value of 1 if the city contains an NBA team, and 0, otherwise. The error
terms, µ1 and µ2, are not uncorrelated because Y2 is correlated with µ2, and, given
that Y2 is part of equation 1, µ2 is correlated with µ1.
Equation 1 models cities that currently have NBA franchises based on X1
(market characteristics) and Y2 (a forecast of potential revenue for an NBA team in
that location). Equation 2 is a forecast equation that is an input into Equation 1. It
is explained by factors in X2, such as market characteristics and team characteris-
tics, that affect the revenue of NBA teams.
Data
The cross-sectional data for Equation 1 of the location model consists of 48
observations from 1999 (unless otherwise specified): 25 are for cities with NBA
teams, and 23 are for cities without NBA teams that are potentially the most eli-
gible cities for league expansion or team relocation.12 There are 12 potential ex-
planatory variables, some of which are correlated (e.g., 1995 metropolitan statiscal
area [MSA] population and 2000 MSA population).13 Each observation represents
information for the year 1999 (except where specified).
The dependent variable in Equation 1, Y1, is an indicator or dummy variable
that distinguishes a city with an NBA team (or two) from a prospective NBA city
without a team for the 1999 season.
In developing a forecasting model for possible locations for NBA teams, it is
imperative to include the population of the market for each team. Five population
variables are examined: 1990 city population, 1999 city population, MSA popula-
tion for the years 1995 and 2000, and the MSA population growth over that pe-
riod.14 It is likely that an NBA team draws not only from the city in which it is
located but also from the surrounding towns and communities. Therefore, the MSA
population is expected to provide the best relative forecast of the population
(1)
(2)
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variables. It is expected that the effect of population on whether a city has or at-
tains an NBA team will be positive. A summary of the data is provided in Table 1.
The growth of a community could play a role in whether an NBA team chooses
to locate there, especially if annual growth is significant and consistent. The growth
variable is the change in MSA population during the past 5 years. The expected
effect is that a higher population growth rate will increase the probability of an
NBA team choosing to locate in a particular area. Alternatively, a city that has a
significant decline in population might decrease the probability of an NBA team
choosing to locate in there.
Typical household income and average pay per worker of the MSA are also
included as potential determining factors of NBA franchise location.15 Other stud-
ies have found income to be a significant factor in determining attendance at sport-
ing events.16 As for location of sports teams, Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) found
that an increase in average household income by $1,000 increased the probability
of the city having a MLB team by 8%. The expected effect is that a higher typical
household income in an MSA will increase the probability of an NBA team choos-
ing that location.
Similarly, a measure of the relative cost of living in these metropolitan areas
is considered in order to obtain a reasonable measure of household disposable
income. The cost of living index takes into consideration nine items that collec-
tively represent more than 60% of the typical household budget, which varies widely
among regions.17 The annual costs for these items were ranked from lowest to
highest and then scored such that 100.00 represents the least expensive, 50.00
indicates the median, and 0.00 ranks as the most expensive city. The theory here is
that regions with higher disposable income might choose to allocate a higher per-
centage of their budget towards recreational and leisure activities, such as attend-
ing an NBA game.
The success of sports teams in the modern era is largely dependent on corpo-
rate support via the purchase of luxury suites, club seats, sponsorship (including
naming rights), and other premium services. The locational analysis includes a
measure of corporate supply by using the number of Fortune 500 companies that
are headquartered in a relevant city.18 Although not a perfect measure of corporate
supply, it is expected that large corporations might want to entertain clients or
employees in the luxury suites of a professional sports franchise located in the city
in which they are headquartered. Also included are two measures of the number of
companies that are considered to be large enough to be interested in premium
services, such as luxury seats, and profitable enough to be able to afford such
services.19
As in any spatial model of competition, the distance between competitors
can affect the success of a business. The distance in miles to the nearest city with
an NBA team is used as a measure of spatial competition. All else equal, it is
expected that franchises that are located far distances from other franchises have a
higher likelihood of success.20
Competitors to a sports franchise would be any other major professional
sports teams located in the same area. For instance, a sports fan might choose to
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attend a hockey game instead of a basketball game. If there was not a hockey team
nearby, however, the fan might choose the basketball game for lack of other sport-
ing alternatives. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the fewer major professional
sports teams there are in a given area, the higher the likelihood will be of success
for an NBA team. The number of teams in the other major professional sports
leagues (NHL, NFL, and MLB) is used as a proxy for sports-entertainment com-
petition. Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999) found that the number of other sports
teams had a positive effect on the location of MLB teams, stating that “the place-
ment of other professional teams establishes the city as ‘major league.’”21
Similarly, an index of the recreational assets available in an MSA is also
included. This is determined by a factor analysis assessed on thirteen criteria to
rate an MSA’s supply of recreation assets.22 These totals are ranked from greatest
(100.0) to lowest (0.0) supply of recreational assets. The hypothesis here is that
fewer recreational assets (lower index score) will result in fewer recreational alter-
natives to attending an NBA game.
Recently, Scarborough Sports Marketing created an index of basketball fa-
naticism based on their survey of U.S. markets. This index is a measure of the
importance of basketball to local residents. For instance, some regions, such as
Indiana, North Carolina, Louisville, and New York City, are known as basketball
‘hotbeds.’ The index is used as a measure of consumer demand for NBA games and
ranges from 1 for the most fanatical city to 63 for the city with the least fanaticism.
Equation 2 uses a panel data set consisting of nineteen variables for each
team in the NBA (except the two Canadian teams) over the years 1997–1999.23
There are three dependent variables: attendance, an estimate of gate receipts, and
total team revenue. The focus of this part of the research is to create a forecasting
model for financial success in the NBA with the proxy for success being total
game attendance, gate receipts, or total revenue. Unlike the NFL, total revenues in
the NBA are highly correlated with gate receipts because there is not a significant
amount of revenue sharing in the NBA.24
Average attendance is being used instead of total attendance because of the
lockout during the 1999 season that caused the cancellation of approximately 32
games out of an 82-game season, including the All-Star Game. The playoffs, how-
ever were not cancelled. High attendance represents one of the goals of a sports
organization. See Table 2 for a summary of the data used for Equation 2.
High gate receipts are another goal of sports organizations. Gate receipts
also help account for capacity constraints, whereas attendance does not. For in-
stance, smaller arenas can charge higher prices if the supply of seats is less than
the demand, mitigating part of the capacity constraint issue. Ticket prices vary
significantly across teams, and, by using only attendance, this price information
would be lost. Gate receipts are estimated using actual attendance and average
ticket price for all 3 years. Actual gate receipts are proprietary information, so
obtaining exact information is difficult. Therefore, an estimate was used. For the
one season of actual gate receipts for NBA teams that is available, the correlation
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between the estimate and the actual is .94.25 This analysis uses an estimate based
on attendance and average ticket price.
The third measure of revenue is total team revenue as reported by Forbes
magazine. Other localized revenue sources not included in gate receipts such as
media, sponsorship, concessions, and parking are included in this figure.
The independent variables used to predict financial success or to measure
attendance demand are prices, team winning percentage, a measure of the quantity
of star players, the age of the venue, the year of the season, basketball fanaticism,
household income, number of other professional sports teams located in the MSA,
2000 MSA population, recreational and cost-of-living indices, number of Fortune
500 companies headquartered in MSA, the number of midsized and large corpora-
tions in MSA, and distance to nearest NBA city.
There is also a vector of prices that fans pay to attend sporting events. These
include the ticket price, the price of a 12-oz beer, the price of a hot dog, the price of
a 12-oz soda, and the price of parking.26 The first law of demand predicts that
higher prices will lead to lower levels of demand, ceteris paribus. Ticket prices
average $44 for the sample, with a low of $24 and a high of $87.
Winning percentage is expected to be an important proxy for the quality of
the home team. The winning percentage in the year each season began, for 1997
through 1999, was used.27 Many studies have found winning to be an important
determinant of attendance demand.28 As expected, the average winning percentage
is near .500 (at .514), with the minimum at .134 and the maximum at .817.29
Lagged winning percentage is also expected to affect demand because the
previous season’s performance affects season ticket sales and the appeal of early-
season games. For instance, Rascher (1999) shows that, in baseball, an extra win
by the home team in the previous season increases per-game attendance by about
450 fans for the first half of the season, but by the second half of the season, the
increase declines in magnitude to 150 fans per game (signfigance declines, as well,
with the t statistic dropping from 7.64 to 3.02).
Relative to other major professional sports, the NBA markets its product by
focusing on the individual talent of the players more so than the quality of each
team. It is expected that the star power of the players on a team will affect the
demand for games above and beyond their skill in producing wins. The analysis
uses the number of All-Star votes that each team received as a proxy for the indi-
vidual star power of each team.
Sports teams in the U.S. have been on a facility construction spree in the last
decade. The older domes built in the late 1960s and early 1970s have given way to
newer, higher quality, entertainment-oriented facilities. These facilities increase
the revenue streams for NBA and NHL teams by as much as 50% because they
offer better amenities including premium seating, parking, food, drink, and non-
game entertainment. In MLB, a new stadium can generate more than $40 million
in new revenue annually.30 The analysis uses the age of the sports venue as a proxy
for the quality of the experience that the fan receives that is unrelated to the game.
The remaining variables were described earlier.
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Analysis and Results
The location model creates a forecast of the best cities for NBA expansion or
relocation based on economic factors that exist in current NBA cities. The depen-
dent variable, whether the city has an NBA team, is an indicator variable. The
model is a two-equation system with a binary dependent variable and a continuous
endogenous variable. The type of triangular system described in the section on the
theoretical model requires a two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) estimation
technique.
The first stage is the estimation of Equation 2, the revenue equation. Typi-
cally, OLS■ estimation would be unbiased and efficient, but there are a few econo-
metric issues that prevent straight OLS from working. First, the revenue equation
is estimated using data for 27 teams over 3 years. The error structure exhibits
cluster correlation. For each team, the error term for 3 years is auto-correlated.
Even though there is not correlation across teams, there is correlation of the errors
within each team. The effect of cluster correlation is to inflate t statistics. In this
case, the t statistics are about 12% higher when not accounting for the cluster
correlation problem. The solution involves estimating robust errors by analyzing a
cluster variable in the model itself.
The second estimation problem is that one of the dependent variables, atten-
dance, is censored because of the capacity constraint of the size of an arena. True
demand might be larger than actual attendance, but the size of the arena prevents
the full demand from being satisfied. Interval regression offers a solution in the
tradition of Tobit.
In calculating the correlation between each of the variables, income and popu-
lation, as expected, are correlated—people in larger cities have higher incomes.
Another multicollinearity issue is among population, the number of corporate head-
quarters, and the number of non-NBA-sports teams. The smallest bivariate corre-
lation among these variables is .73. Although it is not surprising that corporations
and sports teams locate in large population centers, the interpretation of the indi-
vidual effects of these factors on NBA team location could be inefficient, but not
biased, if included simultaneously in econometric analysis. Because the goal in
this step of the analysis is not to interpret individual effects but to create an endog-
enous variable to be used in the next step, these variables were included in the
analysis.
Sensitivity analyses showed that there was no omitted variable bias. Evi-
dence of heteroscedasticity was accounted for using White’s corrected errors. Log-
linear models were estimated, but the levels models had superior fit. Log-linear
models are often used in demand estimation, but only because the elasticities are
easy to calculate. In this case that reason is not compelling enough to use log-
linear models. Table 3 shows the results of the revenue and attendance equations
estimation.
Overall, the attendance model is extremely statistically significant with a
Wald χ2 statistic of 74.14. Both the gate receipts and total-revenue models have R2
values greater than 0.53 and F values that are significant at the 1% level. Each of
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Table 3 Attendance and Revenue Regression Results
Attendance Gate receipts Total revenue
Model (SD) (SD) in millions (SD)
Adjusted R2 — 0.55 0.53
F-value or Wald Chi2 74.14*** 13.42*** 7.86***
Number of observations 81 81 81
Independent variables
constant 1447.55 –39,100,000** –24.4
(0.19) (–2.14) (–0.56)
basketball fanaticism index –91.06*** –319,263*** –0.35
(–3.28) (–4.38) (–1.62)
number of other major sports 405.40 1,209,033 2.79
teams located in city (1.12) (0.82) (0.70)
population of local MSA 0.0000485 1.71 0.0000031
(0.10) (1.39) (1.09)
index of recreation opportunities 27.09 118,218 0.26
(0.75) (1.15) (1.06)
MSA household income 0.1490* 680.2*** 0.00044
(1.67) (3.26) (0.95)
number of midsized companies –0.924 –4208* 0.00034
in MSA (–0.74) (–1.76) (0.06)
current season winning 1451.47 9,033,650 36.53*
percentage (0.52) (0.87) (1.72)
previous season team winning 8136.83*** 13,500,00*** 22.96**
percentage (4.02) (2.82) (1.97)
age of arena –73.06 –235,793* –0.52
(–1.37) (–1.65) (–1.62)
Note. Significance:* = 10% level; ** = 5% level; *** = 1% level. MSA = metropolitan
statistical area.
the Stage-1 models is statistically significant and provides suitable endogenous
variables for Stage 2. Basketball fanaticism, household income, previous season’s
winning percentage, and age of the arena are consistently statistically significant
with the expected signs.31 Interpreting the marginal impacts of a few of the vari-
ables that do not suffer from multicollinearity, a 5% increase in household income
is associated with an 8% increase in gate receipts. An 10 % increase in games won
(e.g., from 0.500 to 0.600—eight more wins) is associated with a rise in gate re-
ceipts of 4%, or $1.35 million. The aging of a stadium is associated with lower
gate receipts, about $235,000 per year.
Table 4 shows the forecasts of attendance, gate receipts, and total revenue
for each NBA and non-NBA city, sorted by decreasing gate receipts.32 Gate re-
ceipts range from a high of $84 million in Chicago, down to $32 million in El
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Table 4 Forecasted Attendance, Gate Receipts, and Total Revenue
City/Team Forecasted Forecasted Forecasted
(sorted by gate receipts) attendance gate receipts ($) total revenue ($)
Chicago Bulls 20,108 45,283,019 103,944,723
New Jersey Nets 19,667 44,609,289 103,666,295
New York Knicks 18,717 41,543,980 96,906,295
Washington Wizards 19,704 41,358,306 83,281,956
Los Angeles Clippers 17,899 38,422,655 97,575,067
Los Angeles Lakers 17,899 38,422,655 97,575,067
Seattle SuperSonics 19,757 38,312,641 71,904,303
Detroit Pistons 18,249 34,583,135 77,497,291
Houston Rockets 18,325 34,298,557 69,692,269
Boston Celtics 18,218 33,924,509 68,763,022
Indiana Pacers 19,235 32,993,512 66,299,117
Philadelphia 76ers 17,729 32,781,592 75,895,337
Portland Trail Blazers 18,715 32,330,039 64,190,119
Memphis 18,796 31,596,200 59,847,117
Utah Jazz 18,622 31,209,019 62,109,120
Hartford 18,134 30,943,166 56,251,917
Phoenix Suns 18,286 30,498,141 72,479,118
Minnesota Timberwolves 17,526 30,384,199 67,701,633
Miami Heat 18,315 29,977,964 67,583,986
Baltimore 17,560 29,429,689 64,518,291
Louisville 18,311 28,911,371 59,396,878
San Diego 17,372 28,460,087 66,524,446
Las Vegas 17,545 27,242,661 59,699,671
Nashville 17,528 26,882,101 58,132,275
Milwaukee Bucks 16,978 26,290,903 58,624,142
Sacramento Kings 17,138 26,101,881 52,459,725
Golden State Warriors 15,762 26,011,957 63,966,882
Honolulu 16,467 25,830,914 50,552,504
San Antonio Spurs 17,354 25,604,283 54,161,323
Norfolk, Virginia Beach,
Newport News 17,058 24,720,174 59,816,386
Dallas Mavericks 15,907 24,685,943 60,500,450
Charlotte Hornets 16,516 23,644,230 51,580,247
St. Louis 16,074 23,606,227 62,257,248
Atlanta Hawks 15,625 23,464,312 62,783,478
Orlando Magic 16,506 23,263,533 55,287,320
New Orleans 16,314 22,026,250 59,897,920
Jacksonville 16,085 21,331,308 54,111,519
Cincinnati 15,644 20,361,607 53,771,644
Cleveland Cavaliers 15,119 20,272,483 56,035,523
(continued)
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Paso, TX. Based on these Stage-1 results (revenues), the best cities for expansion
or relocation are Memphis, Hartford, Baltimore, Louisville, San Diego, Las Ve-
gas, and Nashville.
The second stage of the 2SPLS involves the estimation of Equation 1 with
the estimated dependent variable from Equation 2 as an endogenous variable in
the model. Again, the attendance, gate receipts, and total revenue estimates from
Table 3 are regressors in the estimation of Equation 2. A number of sensitivity tests
were performed on the model before final selection occurred. Scatter plots and the
Cook-Weisberg test show that heteroscedasticity is an issue with the data. White’s
corrected errors are used to avoid inflated t statistics from heteroscedasticity. There
appears to be one or more omitted variables based on the results of the Ramsey
RESET test.
Table 5 shows the results of the probit analysis. Overall, the models are
significant at the 5% or better level. Interpretation of the marginal impacts shows
that a 10% increase in attendance, gate receipts, or total revenue is associated with
an 11%, 10%, and 17% increase in the probability that a city is suitable for an NBA
team, respectively.
Conclusion and Discussion
The forecasts for which cities are “best” for NBA expansion or relocation
are shown in Table 6. Louisville and San Diego lead the list of potential candi-
dates. This model examines the underlying economic structure of the cities in or-
der to create forecasts for expansion or relocation of NBA teams. Models of this
type could be used for many other sports and in other regions and countries.
Austin–San Marcos 15,931 19,766,609 49,390,583
Denver Nuggets 14,939 19,541,896 51,326,220
Kansas City 15,280 19,503,955 54,329,534
Albuquerque 15,394 17,362,572 45,547,891
Columbus 13,879 13,684,159 45,976,470
Pittsburgh 13,357 12,543,029 48,788,601
Omaha 13,553 12,345,181 39,255,986
Buffalo–N. Falls 13,659 11,974,656 46,414,481
Oklahoma City 11,432 11,114,854 33,726,430
Tucson 11,071 10,608,078 31,618,100
El Paso 9,311 10,178,875 19,506,282
Note. Bolded cities are those without an NBA team in 1999.
Table 4 (continued)
City/Team Forecasted Forecasted Forecasted
(sorted by gate receipts) attendance gate receipts ($) total revenue ($)
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Before the 2001–2002 season, the Vancouver Grizzlies of the NBA had to
make a location decision. The team decided to move out of Canada and created a
short list of possible locations that they believed could sustainably and success-
fully support the franchise. San Diego, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Memphis, and
Louisville were on the list. The city of San Diego showed no interest in the Griz-
zlies because, at the time, the city was embroiled in a dispute over a half-built,
publicly financed baseball stadium. The NBA ruled out the city of Las Vegas be-
cause of its ties to gambling. St. Louis had been a contender the year before the
sale, but after the failed purchase of the team by St. Louis Blues (NHL) owner, Bill
Laurie, he declared he would not open the Savvis Center to a an NBA team of
which he was not the owner. The three final locations were quickly narrowed to
two, because New Orleans was unable to generate an offer that was suitable to the
Grizzlies. The decision between Memphis and Louisville was tipped in favor of
Memphis when Federal Express (FedEx), whose headquarters are in Memphis,
made a naming rights offer and equity purchase of the team.33 The results here
support the location decision made by the Grizzlies.
More recently, the Hornets considered Louisville, Norfolk, VA, and New
Orleans for their relocation out of Charlotte before agreeing to terms with New
Orleans. Based on the findings in this study, the Hornets might have been better
off moving to Louisville. This is supported by the fact that attendance last season
in New Orleans was below expectations.
Changes in the revenue-generating capability of sports facilities are among
the most important factors that have improved the profitability of sports-team fran-
chises recently. All four of the major professional sports leagues have recently
seen an increase in the variance of team valuations because the team owners retain
Table 5 Two–Stage Probit Least Squares Results
NBA indicator NBA indicator NBA indicator
Model variable (SD) variable (SD) variable (SD)
Wald Chi–Square 5.84** 12.66*** 9.86***
Number of Observations 45 45 45
Independent Variables
constant –3.30** –3.16*** –5.95***
(–2.21) (–3.08) (–2.98)
attendance from stage one 2.14e-4*** 1.15e-7*** ––
(2.42) — ––
gate receipts from stage one –– (3.56) 0.0855***
total revenue from stage one –– –– (3.14)
Note. Significance: * = 10% level; ** = 5% level; *** = 1% level.
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Table 6 Forecast Results for Location Model Predicting Probable NBA Cities
Forecasted Forecasted Forecasted
City/Team probability probability probability
(sorted by gate receipts)  (attendance) (gate receipts) (total revenue)
Atlanta Hawks 1.000 1.000 1.000
Boston Celtics 1.000 1.000 1.000
Chicago Bulls 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dallas Mavericks 1.000 1.000 1.000
Detroit Pistons 1.000 1.000 1.000
Houston Rockets 1.000 1.000 1.000
Los Angeles Lakers 1.000 1.000 1.000
Los Angeles Clippers 1.000 1.000 1.000
Minnesota Timberwolves 1.000 1.000 1.000
New York Knicks 1.000 1.000 1.000
New Jersey Nets 1.000 1.000 1.000
Golden State Warriors 1.000 1.000 1.000
Philadelphia 76ers 1.000 1.000 1.000
Washington Wizards 1.000 1.000 1.000
Portland Trail Blazers 1.000 1.000 1.000
Seattle SuperSonics 0.997 0.998 0.990
Phoenix Suns 0.937 0.989 0.947
Utah Jazz 0.963 0.962 0.912
Charlotte Hornets 0.919 0.954 0.896
Indiana Pacers 0.873 0.953 0.901
Orlando Magic 0.816 0.862 0.817
Louisville 0.740 0.743 0.751
Milwaukee Bucks 0.501 0.709 0.520
Denver Nuggets 0.675 0.707 0.715
San Antonio Spurs 0.404 0.703 0.549
San Diego 0.696 0.677 0.658
Miami Heat 0.675 0.585 0.615
Las Vegas 0.416 0.345 0.442
Baltimore 0.252 0.288 0.256
St Louis 0.271 0.279 0.299
Cleveland Cavaliers 0.351 0.262 0.323
Norfolk, Virginia Beach,
Newport News 0.220 0.255 0.352
Memphis 0.486 0.241 0.331
Pittsburgh 0.333 0.163 0.328
Hartford 0.209 0.155 0.164
Nashville 0.125 0.115 0.152
Sacramento Kings 0.130 0.107 0.087
(continued)
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much of facility revenues. Although the size and magnitude of a team’s market is
important in determining its revenue-generating ability in the league, facility eco-
nomics has quickly caught up with market size in determining financial success,
as evidenced by the recent franchise moves and the awarding of a new NFL fran-
chise to Houston over Los Angeles.
The major determinants of the profitability of any major professional sports
franchise are the type of lease agreement it has and the quality of its stadium.
Hence, an important aspect of the location decision is not only the underlying
economics of the market but also the actual lease agreement offered to a team by
each city. In other words, if the market economics are better in a larger city, models
of this sort can help determine how much better a lease agreement has to be from
a smaller city in order to convince an owner to move to the smaller city.34
If an expansion team were considering a relatively larger market such as
Kansas City (population of 1.8 million), for example, versus a smaller market such
as Buffalo (population of 1.2 million), the model forecasts that a Kansas City team
would generate about $8 million more per year in total revenue (about 17% more)
than would a team in Buffalo. In order for a team to move to Buffalo, the lease
agreement would have to include at least $8 million more per year in expected
revenue for the team. For instance, the combination of lower rent, property tax,
sales tax, percentages of parking, concessions, etc. that the team keeps would have
to add up to at least $8 million more than the lease in Kansas City offered.
In a real example, in choosing New Orleans over Louisville, the Hornets
assessed expected attendance, gate receipts, and total revenues. According to the
findings here, expected total revenues were about the same, but attendance and
gate receipts were forecasted to be higher in Louisville than in New Orleans.
Austin – San Marcos 0.073 0.055 0.118
Kansas City 0.017 0.015 0.036
Cincinnati 0.003 0.001 0.004
New Orleans 0.002 0.000 0.004
Columbus 0.002 0.000 0.004
Jacksonville 0.000 0.000 0.000
Albuquerque 0.000 0.000 0.000
Buffalo – N.Falls 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note. Bolded cities are those without an NBA team in 1999.
Table 6 (continued)
Forecasted Forecasted Forecasted
City/Team probability probability probability
(sorted by gate receipts)  (attendance) (gate receipts) (total revenue)
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Presumably, the lease agreement in New Orleans accounted for the difference in
forecasted gate receipts between the two possible locations.
In choosing Memphis over New Orleans, Louisville, St. Louis, Las Vegas,
and San Diego, the Grizzlies chose the market with the highest expected atten-
dance and gate receipts but not the highest total revenue. As described earlier in
this article, however, San Diego was not in a position to offer to build a new facil-
ity and the owner of the Savvis Center in St. Louis was not interested in having an
NBA team in the facility unless he owned it.
By using a hierarchical, two-equation system involving the underlying eco-
nomic factors that are deterministic for a team’s success, this article provides a
model that aids in the financial decision regarding league expansion or team relo-
cation. This integrative approach effectively captures inter-relationships among
factors, as well as the relative importance of each factor. A set of models such as
described in this article are not solely applicable to NBA franchise location deci-
sions but can also be used to rank cities for further, more in-depth analysis across
many sports and in many countries.
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Notes
1The third time was a charm for New Orleans. Since losing the Jazz to Utah in 1979,
the city had twice attempted to land an NBA team. The NBA blocked an attempt to bring the
Minnesota Timberwolves to New Orleans in 1994, and the Vancouver Grizzlies, who the
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city made a major effort to land in 2000, moved instead to Memphis.
2The original teams include the Boston Celtics, Chicago Stags, Cleveland Rebels,
Detroit Falcons, New York Knickerbockers, Philadelphia Warriors, Pittsburgh Ironmen,
Providence Steamrollers, St. Louis Bombers, Toronto Huskies, and the Washington Capi-
tols. Teams still in existence include the Boston Celtics, New York Knicks, and the Golden
State Warriors (by way of Philadelphia and San Francisco).
3The American Basketball Association (ABA) existed for nine full seasons from 1967
to 1976. During that time, the ABA competed with the established NBA for players, fans,
and media attention. In June 1976, the two rival professional leagues merged, with the four
strongest ABA teams (the New York Nets, Denver Nuggets, Indiana Pacers, and San Anto-
nio Spurs) joining the NBA. The other remaining ABA teams vanished, along with the ABA
itself.
4The Oilers moved from Houston to Memphis, TN, in 1997 but did not change their
name to the Titans until the move from Memphis to Nashville in 1999. The NFL then ex-
panded back into Cleveland, in September 1998, forming the Cleveland Browns, and into
Houston, whose expansion franchise commenced play in 2002 as the Houston Texans.
5The agreement is for a 10-year lease, with the team paying $2 million annual rent
and receiving all the revenue from premium seating, advertising, naming rights, conces-
sions, novelty, and parking—a guarantee of at least $18 million in annual arena revenue for
the team. The rent is subject to adjustment if attendance is under 11,000 a game but will not
drop below $1 million. All expenses to move the team were covered by the city of New
Orleans, as were all incidentals incurred as a result of the relocation. The team moved into
New Orleans Arena, which the city spent $15 million to upgrade to NBA standards.
New Orleans’ median household income is $38,800 a year, below the national aver-
age and below Charlotte’s median income of $51,000. New Orleans’s TV market, ranked
43rd nationally, is the smallest in the NBA; Charlotte’s TV market ranks 27th.
6Those teams are the New Orleans Saints (1966), Seattle Seahawks (1974), Tampa
Bay Buccaneers (1974), Carolina Panthers (1994), Jacksonville Jaguars (1994), Cleveland
Browns (1999), and Houston Texans (2002).
7Minnesota Vikings’ owner, Red McCombs, said the Vikings cannot remain com-
petitive unless they get a new stadium to replace the Metrodome. Getting a new stadium
built for the Vikings was Red McCombs’ top priority, but measures to finance a stadium in
Minnesota have twice failed. McCombs suggestion that the team relocate to San Antonio is
unlikely because San Antonio is another small market in a state with two teams, the Dallas
Cowboys and the Houston Texans.
8See Baim and Sitsky (1994) and Rich (2000) for an in-depth discussion of the poli-
tics of stadium financing.
9In 1999 there were 29 teams in the NBA, with two located in Canada (the Vancouver
team has recently moved to Memphis, Tennessee), and two each in the Los Angeles and
New York areas.
10Data for the degree of public financial support for current arenas comes from Turn-
key Sports, LLC.
11The correlation between city population and the percentage of an arena that was
publicly financed is 0.45, which is significant at the 1% level.
12The choice of the 23 non-NBA cities is simply based on MSA population.
13These variables were chosen based on a review of the literature, on the availability
of data, and on knowledge regarding the theory of demand. Ultimately, the data will deter-
mine their applicability.
294 Rascher and Rascher
14City population variables were derived from U.S. Census data, and MSA popula-
tion data is from Places Rated Almanac (Savageau, 2000).
15The income variables are average pay per worker by MSA (1999), and typical house-
hold income by MSA (1999). See Places Rated Almanac (Savageau, 2000).
16See Rascher (1999) for a discussion of factors that affect demand at sporting events.
17Theses nine items are state income taxes, state and local sales taxes, property taxes,
home mortgage or rent, utilities, food, health care, transportation, and recreation. The re-
maining 40% is composed of federal income taxes, investments, and miscellaneous goods
and services. See Places Rated Almanac (Savageau, 2000).
18See Places Rated Almanac (Savageau, 2000).
19See Dun & Bradstreet. Figures were compiled by MSA for companies with more
than 25 employees and earning more than $5 million in annual revenues, referred to as
“Mid-sized Corporations.” Also included was a measure compiled by MSA for companies
with more than 50 employees and earnings in excess of $10 million annually, referred to as
“Large Corporations.”
20Although it is true, however, that distance isolates the franchise from competition,
the amount of isolation from competitors also has the negative effect of increasing team
travel costs. This article analyzes revenues, not costs. In general, the variation in costs from
franchise to franchise is not a function of locational attributes, but relates to decisions re-
garding team salary and marketing expenditures, for instance. An analysis of profits was
considered, but reliable profit data are unavailable.
21Bruggink and Zamparelli (1999), p. 55.
22This includes: amusement and theme parks, aquariums, auto racing, college sports,
gambling, golf courses, good restaurants, movie theater screens, professional sports, pro-
tected recreation areas, skiing, water areas, and zoos. See Places Rated Almanac (Savageau,
2000).
23The Canadian teams are excluded for lack of comparable data. In excluding the
Canadian teams 81 observations are omitted (27 teams for three seasons).
24For the corresponding years, in the NFL, the 32 franchises share approximately
80% of gross revenues. In MLB, teams share approximately 33% of total revenues, the
NBA shares in excess of 35% of league revenues, and the NHL shares approximately 30%
of total revenues. In most leagues, certain localized revenue streams are exempted from the
revenue sharing formula, including revenues generated by the stadium (as opposed to the
team), such as premium seating (club seats and luxury suites), sponsorship, parking, and
concessions. Stadium-based revenues are increasing at impressive rates, growing more dra-
matically in recent years because of luxury suites, naming rights, etc. Hence, the recent
boom in stadium construction is primarily in response to these revenue-sharing exemp-
tions. The level of an individual team’s financial success is dependant on the team’s ability
to capitalize on the local market in terms of stadium economics.
25The actual reported gate receipts are for the year 1999.
26This data comes from the Fan Cost Index™ published annually by Team Marketing
Report.
27To create a fair forecast, however, all cities were assumed to have a winning per-
centage of 0.500, given that non-NBA cities do not have a winning percentage at all.
28For example, see Burdekin and Idson (1991), Hausman and Leonard (1997), Hoang
and Rascher (1999), and McDonald and Rascher (2000).
29Winning percentage is not exactly at 0.500 because the data does not include the
two Canadian teams who have subpar records.
30See CSL, Inc. (1999).
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31Prices were not found to be an important factor (except to the extent that there was
multicollinearity) in forecasting attendance, with no t statistic exceeding .40. Cost of living,
all-star votes, and distance to nearest NBA city also proved to be insignificant predictors of
attendance and revenue.
32Results shown are for the 1999-2000 NBA season. The Lakers and Clippers have
the same forecast because the variables in the model are market specific, and therefore the
same for both teams. The only difference among teams sharing a locale is winning percent-
age, and, in this table, all teams’ winning percentages were set to 0.500 in order to create
comparable forecasts for cities without NBA teams (which do not have a corresponding
winning percentage).
33Memphis had attracted enough investors to buy a 49% interest in the team, whereas
Louisville investors were only able to offer a 20% stake in the team. FedEx helped to seal
the deal for Memphis by agreeing to pay $100 million for naming rights for a new stadium
in Memphis and the team (Memphis Express), matching the offer of Tricon Global Restau-
rants (parent company of Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut and Taco Bell) that reportedly
offered $100 million for the naming rights of the new arena.
34We thank one of the reviewers for noting this use of the model.
